烟雾缭绕的会议室中的会议是否促进了合谋?

Do Meetings in Smoke‐Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?

Journal of Political Economy · 1997
被引 98
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

提出《谢尔曼法》禁止企业开会讨论价格,可能反而帮助企业通过提高会议成本来防止重新谈判,从而促进合谋,解释了立法者为何选择较小的制裁力度。

Abstract

The Sherman Act prohibits firms from discussing prices in meetings. Traditional thought suggests that this prohibition makes it harder for firms to collude, and economists have concluded that the Sherman Act operates in the public interest. The author provides an alternative explanation for the act that also accounts for the small sanctions chosen by the legislature. When firms interact in a dynamic environment in which the law helps them to prevent renegotiation, the firms may benefit from the law that makes it costly, but not very costly, to meet to discuss prices. The Sherman Act may help firms to collude. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

谢尔曼法合谋价格讨论动态博弈