Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets
通过11个实验市场，研究卖家如何通过可观察的昂贵质量升级来传递产品等级信息，分析信号传递均衡与混合均衡的表现。
In a series of eleven markets, sellers possessed products that were exogenously designated \nas either grade "regular" or grade "super." Supers were valued more by buyers but grade \ncould not be observed by buyers prior to purchase. Sellers could add costly units of quality \nto their products that were observable and valued by buyers. The data are analyzed with \nperfect information models, signaling equilibrium models, and pooling models. A variety \nof behaviors are observed across the eleven markets. Signaling is observed in most markets \nwith some markets approaching the most efficient signaling equilibrium. Pooling or partial \npooling occurs in a few markets. The performance seems to be sensitive to the relative cost \nof signaling and the market institutional setting.