Regulated Managerial Insider Trading as a Mechanism to Facilitate Shareholder Control
证明，适当监管下的管理层内幕交易能减少信息不对称，帮助股东更好地筛选公司投资决策。经理通过自愿购买公司股票部分透露私人信息，股东据此评估提案，但需公开报告交易并禁止短期反向操作。
This paper shows that managerial insider trading, suitably regulated, reduces information asymmetry and helps shareholders better screen corporate decisions. In a setting where a firm's manager has private information about potential projects and his preferences differ from those of shareholders, I derive a unique perfect‐sequential equilibrium (Grossman and Perry, 1986) where the manager's inside information is partially revealed through his voluntary purchase of the firm's stock, and shareholders screen investment proposals based on the revealed information. However, to make information revelation credible, the manager should be required to report his trading publicly and be prohibited from making a short‐term reversal of his position.