Information Acquisition and Welfare
研究了在战略互补或替代行为及多种外部性下，信息获取的均衡效率与有效效率的关系，并分析了私人信息获取如何影响公共信息的社会价值，最后在价格粘性和分散信息的货币经济中展示了结果的应用。
We study information acquisition in a flexible framework with strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions and a rich set of externalities that are responsible for possible wedges between the equilibrium and the efficient acquisition of information. First, we relate the (in)efficiency in the acquisition of information to the (in)efficiency in the use of information and explain why efficiency in the use is no guarantee of efficiency in the acquisition. Next, we show how the acquisition of private information affects the social value of public information (i.e. the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the quality of public information). Finally, we illustrate the implications of the results in a monetary economy with price rigidities and dispersed information about productivity shocks.