Short-Time Compensation, Job Security, and Employment Contracts: Evidence from Selected OECD Countries
构建最优雇佣合同模型，分析各国裁员限制和短时补偿制度差异，发现短时补偿比传统失业保险更慷慨时，会导致工时大幅波动；对10个OECD国家的检验证实了这一预测。
In this paper, a model of optimal employment contracting describes differences across countries in firing restrictions and short-time compensation systems for workers forced to work shorter hours to avoid layoff. The model predicts that the existence of a short-time compensation system will generate major fluctuations in working hours only if the short-time compensation system is more generous than the traditional unemployment insurance system. A test performed for ten OECD countries shows that in countries with generous short-time compensation systems, the speed of adjustment of total hours worked is higher than in the United States, despite a much slower adjustment in the number of workers employed. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.