Too Much Monitoring, Not Enough Performance Pay
在一个简单的一般均衡框架内，内生化竞争性企业的内部组织形式，探讨监控团队、集体绩效薪酬团队和自雇三种激励方案的选择，发现市场均衡可能多重且帕累托可排序，并指出限制监控和自雇的政策可能使所有人受益。
This paper endogenises the internal organisation of competitive firms in a simple general equilibrium framework. The options are monitored teams, unmonitored teams motivated by collective performance pay, and self-employment. The choice of incentive scheme depends on market price and also affects price through its influence on output. As more people opt for self employment, pecuniary externalities increase the pressure on the rest to follow suit and Pareto rankable multiple equilibria arise. The conditions for a competitive equilibrium to be constrained efficient are restrictive and everyone may gain from policies limiting monitoring and self employment and from the imposition of entry taxes.