The euro crisis: undetected by conventional economics, favoured by nationally focused polity
解释了欧元启动的成功及其在希腊债务危机后的困境，指出新古典宏观经济学误导了对危机的诊断，而各国政府以货币一体化为名推行改革、维护本国利益，导致危机加剧。
This article interprets the initial success of the launch of the euro and its 'muddling through' since the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. Two interrelated processes interacted to deliver a quite complex idiosyncratic systemic crisis. First, new classical macroeconomics had diffused the belief that market economies are structurally stable, money is neutral, financial markets are efficient and that the only culprit is public finance. The euro crisis was thus inaccurately diagnosed. Second, in the political arena, monetary integration has been used by many governments as a justification for liberalisation reforms opposed by various domestic social groups. At the European level, most governments have been defending national interests, whereas the European Commission and European Parliament had lost most of their expertise and legitimacy in defending a common community in line euro ambitions. Crisis resolution calls for leadership from a key collective actor, to return coherence to the eurozone's institutional setting. Copyright , Oxford University Press.