Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets
探讨了健康保险市场的多种监管方式，分析它们能否解决逆向选择问题，并指出政府政策需通过国有部门交叉补贴或授予私营保险公司专属权来避免效率损失。
In this paper we look at various ways to regulate the health insurance market and ask whether they provide an answer to the problem of adverse selection. To avoid inefficiency, government policy must either effectuate some cross-subsidization of insurance policies within the state sector or grant private insurance firms an exclusive right to serve certain groups of the population. Recent reforms in the Netherlands and Germany and President Clinton's proposals for the US could be adapted to fulfil these requirements. Efficiency cannot be achieved, on the other hand, if the regulator tries to "prescribe" cross-subsidization within the private sector.