Allocating irrigation water: the impact of strategic interactions on the efficiency of rules
研究了灌溉方案中农民自主决策种植模式时，不同水分配规则（如按种植面积分配）的效率，通过模拟突尼斯灌溉方案的纳什均衡，发现过度种植现象并推荐更优规则。
In many irrigation schemes, farmers are autonomous in decision making regarding cropping patterns. Some allocation rules currently used in such schemes share water according to what farmers cultivate but then permit an interaction among farmers' choices, whose outcome may be described as a Nash equilibrium. Such rules are compared with other existing and potential rules, when farmers differ in their individual abilities to create value from water. A model simulating the Nash equilibrium associated with farmers' cropping choices reproduces the overcropping pattern observed in an irrigation scheme in Tunisia and makes possible the recommendation of better allocation rules.