或有债权的策略分析

Strategic analysis of contingent claims

European Economic Review · 1996
被引 115
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

指出传统或有债权分析难以拟合市场数据,原因在于未真实建模财务困境。作者通过非合作博弈均衡推导估值公式,展示如何将静态破产模型融入动态博弈,并求解连续时间等价形式,以得到债券定价的闭式解或数值解。

Abstract

Traditional contingent claims analysis provides an elegant and complete model of the financing of the dynamic firm but has difficulty fitting the observations in the market. Recent work in corporate finance suggests this is because of its failure to model financial distress realistically. We survey recent efforts to address this issue by deriving valuation formulae from the analysis of non-cooperative equilibria in extensive form games. We illustrate how a simple static bankruptcy model can be incorporated in a dynamic game. We then show how to find the continuous time equivalent of this game. This we use to find closed-form bond formulae in special cases and to exploit efficient numerical techniques generally.

或有债权博弈论破产成本公司金融