UNIFORM PRICE AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS BASED ON MULTIPLE ROUNDS LINEAR BIDDING AND ITS EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
研究了连续同质可分割商品的统一价格拍卖机制，在供给可变、多轮线性投标和独立私人估值的条件下，分析了投标人的渐进策略行为和均衡点的形成过程，发现均衡点唯一且不受投标顺序和初始点影响。
In this paper, the auction problem of a kind of continuous homogeneous divisible goods is studied and a uniform price auction mechanism is presented based on three conditions, i.e. the auctioneer’s supply is variable, every bidder submits multiple rounds continuous linear bidding, and every bidder’s valuation to per unit of the goods is independent private information. Concretely, two key problems, i.e. the bidders’ asymptotic strategic behaviours and forming process and composition of equilibrium points are explored. The conclusion is drawn that different bidders’ bidding order and different starting points of initial bidding would not cause different local equilibrium points, and if the equilibrium points exist, then the equilibrium point is unique.