Unemployment and Wages Under Worker Moral Hazard with Firm-Specific Cycles
研究工人道德风险导致的效率工资模型，企业产出价格在高、低水平间波动。无长期工资承诺时就业呈刚性，而企业若能承诺绩效工资，则更愿先解雇年轻工人并支付较低初始工资，使就业更灵活。
The author studies a model of efficiency wages due to worker moral hazard, where firms output prices shift between a high (H) and low (L) level. With no long-run wage commitments and identical treatment of workers, employment is cyclically rigid, and more so the shorter H periods are relative to L periods. When firms can commit to performance dependent wages, they instead prefer to first lay off young (untested) workers and pay them a lower initial wage, making employment more flexible. Private unemployment benefits are never paid to laid-off workers, even though temporary layoffs are never used to enforce effort. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.