Taxation of Couples under Assortative Mating
基于多维筛选框架，研究选型婚配程度如何影响已婚夫妻的最优税收设计，发现当婚配高度选型时，最优税制可分离，即个人税负不依赖配偶收入。
I present a simple and tractable model of the optimal taxation of married couples, working off of the multidimensional screening framework of Armstrong and Rochet (1999). In particular, I study how the tax code varies with the degree of assortative mating. One result is that the “negative jointness” of marginal tax rates found in Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2007, 2009) for couples with uncorrelated earnings should be attenuated in the presence of assortative mating. When mating is sufficiently assortative, the optimal tax schedule is separable: an individual's taxes do not depend on his or her spouse's income.