Bank Underwriting of Debt Securities: Modern Evidence
比较银行控股公司下属子公司与投资银行承销债务证券的表现，发现银行承销低信用评级企业债券时价格更高，且未发现利益冲突，银行还帮助更多小企业发行债券。
This article examines debt securities underwritten by Section 20 subsidiaries of bank holding companies relative to those underwritten by investment houses. Consistent with a net certification effect for banks, bank underwriting of lower credit rated firms to whom the bank lends results in relatively higher prices (lower yields). We find no evidence of conflicts of interest even when an issue is used to repay bank debt. Further, banks bring a relatively larger proportion of small issues to the market. Contrary to the contention that universal banking stunts availability of finance to small firms, bank underwritings appear to benefit small firms.