Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom
研究了美国和英国公司使用薪酬顾问与CEO薪酬的关系，发现使用顾问的公司CEO薪酬更高、股权激励更多，但顾问的利益冲突并未导致薪酬设计恶化。
Executive Overview Executive compensation consultants are investigated using data from the United States and the United Kingdom. The study yields a number of findings. First, CEO pay is generally greater in firms that use compensation consultants, consistent with a rent-extraction theory of executive pay. Second, the amount of equity used in the CEO compensation package, such as stock options, is greater in firms that use consultants. This is consistent with alignment of manager and shareholder interests. Third, there is little evidence that using consultants with potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the adverse design of pay contracts.