Pecuniary Incentives to Work in the United States during World War II
论证二战期间美国平民工作的大幅增加不能用工资等金钱激励解释，因为战时税后实际工资低于战前战后，其他金钱因素也不一致，暗示非金钱因素可能更重要。
It is argued that changes in workers' budget sets cannot explain the dramatic increases in civilian work in the United States during World War II. Although money wages grew during the period, wartime after‐tax real wages were lower than either before or after the war. Evidence from the 1940s also appears to be inconsistent with other pecuniary explanations such as wealth effects of government policies, intertemporal substitution induced by asset prices, unfulfilled expectations, and changes in the nonmarket price of time. Although untested and relatively undeveloped, nonpecuniary models of behavior are tempting explanations for wartime work.