Institutional Ownership and Monitoring Effectiveness: It's Not Just How Much but What Else You Own
研究发现，机构投资者的投资组合特征（如持股规模、组合中其他大额持股数量、换手率及特定持股的重要性）会削弱其对高管薪酬的监督效果，建议未来研究同时考虑公司层面和组合层面的影响。
Corporate governance research indicates that large owners provide effective monitoring. In this article, we expand firm-level notions of monitoring to include large institutional owners' investment portfolios and suggest that portfolio characteristics affect owners' motivation and capacity to monitor, which compromises the positive effects of monitoring at the firm level. Specifically, using data from 533 large firms over a 10-year period, we find that increases in the size of portfolio holdings, number of portfolio blockholdings, portfolio turnover, and the importance of a particular holding reduce monitoring effectiveness in the context of executive compensation. Overall, we provide preliminary evidence that the portfolio characteristics of the largest institutional owners contradict firm-level monitoring effects; therefore, we strongly recommend that future studies consider both firm- and portfolio-level effects simultaneously to understand monitoring effectiveness.