COMPENSATION FOR QUALITY DIFFERENCE IN A SEARCH MODEL OF MONEY*
研究在无交易成本且信息完全的物物交换经济中，质量改进努力因敲竹杠问题得不到补偿；引入货币后，高质量生产者可通过与持有低质量商品和货币的交易者交换获得补偿，货币注入能激励几乎所有生产者提供高质量商品。
We study an economy in which there is always double coincidence of wants, agents have perfect information about qualities of goods, and there are no transaction costs. The hold‐up problem arises because efforts invested in improving quality prior to search may not be compensated in the market. Situations in which barter fails to motivate quality improvement are identified. With money, however, the extra effort in quality improvement will be compensated when high‐quality good producers trade with agents holding both the low‐quality good and money. Injection of money can induce almost all agents to produce the high‐quality good.