Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies
设计了一个在递减规模报酬技术下实现林达尔对应的机制，该机制满足个体可行性、预算平衡、连续性和可微性，且消息空间维度最小。
This paper considers the problem of designing 'well-behaved' mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations in the presence of decreasing returns to scale technologies. The mechanism presented here is individually feasible, balanced, continuous, and differentiable around Nash equilibria. Further, the mechanism has a message space of minimal dimension. Moreover, the authors show that, in contrast to mechanisms dealing with constant returns to scale, an important characteristic of mechanisms implementing the Lindahl correspondence with decreasing returns to scale technologies is that at least one individual's personalized prices depend on his own messages, provided the mechanisms are balanced and smooth. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.