Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
通过理论和实验研究多轮价格引导的组合拍卖，发现若竞拍者对效率相关和核心相关包积极出价且失败者出价至极限，拍卖可实现有效或核心分配；实验支持了竞拍者仅做少量重要出价等假设，并比较了组合时钟拍卖与同步递增拍卖。
We use theory and experiment to explore the performance of multi-round, price-guided, combinatorial auctions. We define efficiency-relevant and core-relevant packages and show that if bidders bid aggressively on these and losing bidders bid to their limits, then the auction leads to efficient or core allocations. We study the theoretically relevant behaviors and hypothesize that subjects will make only a few significant bids, and that certain simulations with auto-bidders will predict variations in performance across different environments. Testing the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) design, we find experimental support for these two hypotheses. We also compare the CCA to a simultaneous ascending auction.