Holdout: Existence, Information, and Contingent Contracting
实验室实验研究敲竹杠问题的范围，发现信息不对称和缺乏或有合同会导致效率损失，引入或有合同能促进谈判成功，但并未显著改善买方福利。
The holdout problem permeates policy discussions of legal issues involving bargaining for land acquisition and more broadly impacts multilateral bargaining between agents. Laboratory experiments investigate the scope of the holdout problem. The research strategy incorporates as treatment variables available information and the exposure problem arising from the unavailability of contingent contracts. An examination reveals that holdout can reliably produce large inefficiencies and lost opportunities for mutually advantageous trade. The introduction of contingent contracts facilitates successful bargaining. However, buyers are not made significantly better off by contingent contracts.