Board Interlocks and Firm Performance: Toward a Combined Agency–Resource Dependence Perspective
提出结合代理理论与资源依赖理论的视角，分析董事会连锁对企业绩效的正负影响，发现其效果取决于企业相对资源、权力不平衡、所有权集中度和CEO所有权，对145家意大利公司的检验支持了假设。
This study develops a combined agency–resource dependence perspective and applies it to the study of interlocking directorates. It suggests that interlocking directorates may exert either a positive or a negative effect on subsequent firm performance, depending on the firm’s relative resources, power imbalance, ownership concentration, and CEO ownership. A test on a sample of 145 Italian companies provides support for hypothesized effects. This study suggests that integrating agency and resource dependence theories provides a higher-order explanation of firm performance and helps advance both agency and resource dependence theories.