The Interdependence between Trade Credit and Bank Lending: Commitment in Intermediary Firm Relationships
研究葡萄牙468家中小企业发现，单一银行关系导致信息垄断和高利率，而供应商提供的贸易信贷可作为短期债务的替代，缓解银行敲竹杠问题。
This study investigates the interdependence between trade and bank credit among 468 ortuguese small and medium‐sized enterprises (s). The results show that a single bank relationship is prevalent among ortuguese s, indicating that the proprietary borrower information that banks obtain through their relationship results in an information monopoly that creates a holdup problem and leads to high interest rates. Suppliers that can control their customers' credit risk may provide additional credit and thus help alleviate concerns associated with holdup costs. Trade credit is a viable alternative to short‐term debt, especially when firms' main bank is unwilling to increase its exposure to liquidity constraints.