INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS IN UNION MODELS
研究在工会与企业谈判模型中区分内部人（已就业工人）和外部人（失业或临时工）的重要性，发现工资同时受内外因素影响，且美国证据表明内部人权力不限于工会现象。
Abstract. This paper examines the importance of distinguishing between ‘insiders’and ‘outsiders’in models of union‐firm bargaining. In general, insiders are those workers already established in the firm, while outsiders are either unemployed or working in temporary, low‐security jobs. Modifying traditional union models to take account of this distinction is straightforward in one‐period models, where the union is assumed to be indifferent to the welfare of outsiders, but is much more complicated in dynamic models. Some of the predictions of insider‐outsider models concerning wage rigidity and unemployment are not robust. However, the prediction that wages will depend on both insider and outsider forces is robust and appears to be supported by the empirical evidence. Furthermore, evidence from the U.S. suggests that insider power should not be viewed as a purely union phenomenon.