Collusion in Dynamic Oligopolies in the Presence of Entry Threats
研究了在存在内生进入决策的寡头垄断博弈中，即使进入壁垒很小，只要贴现率足够低，基于最严厉对称惩罚的策略也能维持一定程度的合谋。
This paper considers a generalized oligopoly supergame, where an endogenous entry decision is included. The author proves that strategies based on most severe symmetric punishments can sustain some degree of collusion even with arbitrarily small entry barriers provided that the discount rate is sufficiently small. The model provides a justification for a view suggesting that neither substantial barriers to entry nor strategic or informational asymmetries are necessary for an oligopoly with some degree of cooperation to prevail. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.