Team Human Capital and Worker Mobility
提出“团队人力资本”概念，研究团队成员私下知道自己的保留工资后如何重新谈判薪酬，发现团队中离职人数不超过阈值才能保持高生产率，导致工资决策相互依赖，并可能引发低效率的团队解散，而合伙制可降低这种低效率。
The authors discuss the concept of 'team human capital' and study the renegotiation of labor compensation after team members privately observe their own reservation wage. As labor productivity can only be high if the number of quits does not exceed a threshold, decisions concerning acceptance of individual wage demands become interdependent. When a team is made up of salaried workers, a peculiar case of efficiency wage results. Moreover, inefficient team dissolution may occur. The authors then show that inefficiency is less likely to occur when team members form a partnership. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.