Managerial incentives: on the Near Linearity of Optimal Compensation
研究当管理者不仅付出努力还做出选择时，最优薪酬合同如何趋向线性；当努力成本很小时，线性合同优于相对业绩评价，且包含所有公平赌注时线性合同成本最低。
Contracts are examined when outcomes depend on managers' choices as well as efforts. As the cost of effort shrinks relative to payoffs, the optimal contract converges to a linear payoff if the control space of the agent has full dimensionality, but not otherwise. Thus, when the agent can trade expected return for greater correlation with other returns, it is better to ignore relative performance when the cost of effort is small. When the choices include all fair gambles and hedges, the linear schedule is no more expensive than any other schedule that induces effort. Unfair gambles are examined as well.