The Impact of Security Analysts' Monitoring and Marketing Functions on the Market Value of Firms
研究证券分析师的监督和营销功能如何影响企业市场价值，发现分析师关注能降低代理成本并扩大投资者认知，从而提升企业价值，且分析师更倾向于跟踪高质量公司以便营销。
In this study, we examine the impact of security analysts' monitoring and marketing functions on firms' market value. We postulate that security analysts' monitoring of corporate performance helps motivate managers, thus reducing the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. We also argue that the information intermediary function provided by security analysts helps expand the breadth of investor cognizance. Consistent with these conjectures, this study finds that analyst following exerts a significant and positive impact on firms' market value. We also find evidence that security analysts have a stronger incentive to follow stocks of high quality companies, since such stocks arc easier to market. Hence, the security analysis activities appear to be determined, in part, by the marketing considerations of brokerage companies.