Pollution Claim Settlements under Correlated Information
研究在污染索赔中，当代理人的污染成本私人信息相互关联时，如何设计激励相容且转移支付非负的机制，发现随着代理人数量增加，搭便车问题缓解，事前预算平衡下可实现事后效率。
Agents have to decide whether a polluting plant will be operated or not. Agents' disutility (cost) from pollution is privately known, but correlated across agents. Incentive compatible mechanisms are characterized under the assumption that transfer payments are non-negative. The implementability constraint is similar to the independence case, except that virtual utilities are diminished by a factor due to the correlation of agents' types. As correlation vanishes, the implementability constraint approaches the implementability constraint of the independent types environment. It is established that the free-riding problem is relaxed as the number of agents increases. With many agents, ex post efficiency is achievable under ex ante budget balance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, H41.