Optimal Contracts with Shirking
在标准连续时间委托代理模型中，明确推导了代理人存在偷懒行为时的最优动态激励合同，发现了两种包含频繁偷懒阶段的新合同，分别对应奖励和惩罚机制。
I explicitly derive the optimal dynamic incentive contract in a standard continuous-time agency setting where the agent has a shirking action. My solution generates two dynamic contracts new to the literature. Both contracts include phases when the agent frequently shirks. In one contract, the shirking phases are relaxation periods rewarding the agent for good performance. In the other, the shirking phases are suspension-type arrangements punishing the agent for poor performance. In addition, I also explore the relationships between optimal contracting and taxes, bargaining, and renegotiation. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.