无嫉妒性与分配正义

ENVY‐FREENESS AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Journal of Economic Surveys · 1994
被引 121
人大 AABS 2

中文导读

综述了无嫉妒性这一分配正义核心标准,从简单分配模型扩展到天赋差异和生产模型,并讨论了最小化嫉妒和无支配等最新进展,最后指出五大研究难题。

Abstract

Abstract. The criterion of envy‐freeness, according to which no agent should prefer any of his neighbours’allocation to his own, has become a central part of the economic theory of distributive justice. It essentially corresponds to the need to express an ideal of equality in societies where preferences and endowments are heterogeneous. This paper surveys various formulations of the idea of envy‐freeness, starting with the simple distribution model, then adding the possibility for agents to have different native talent endowments, and finally moving to models with production. Many classical results are displayed, but emphasis is also put on recent developments, mainly the ideas of ‘minimizing envy’and of ‘absence of domination’. Five major difficulties facing envyfreeness are identified and listed as directions of future research.

无妒性分配正义最小化嫉妒无支配