A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes
提出，自由派政党推动的收入再分配会抑制生产积极性，因此新当选的自由派政府可能通过货币扩张来弥补实际收入的损失。实证发现，社会支出占GNP比重的变化以及总统从保守派转为自由派时，货币增长均显著上升。
This paper indicates that income redistribution, motivated by the distributive ideals of liberal political p arties, create unanticipated disincentives for productive effort. Thi s suggests that newly-elected liberal parties are likely to engage in monetary surprises in order to compensate for the adverse effects of these disincentives on real income. Estimated reaction from function s support these predictions. A measure of income redistribution, the change in the ratio of the social expenditures of government to GNP, has a positive significant effect on money growth. In addition, when the Presidency changes from conservative to liberal, there is a posit ive and significant increase on money growth. Copyright 1987 by Ohio State University Press.