On the Deadweight Cost of Production Requirements for Geographically Differentiated Agricultural Products
研究在允许生产者合谋以覆盖固定成本的情况下，不同合谋方案（投入配额与产出配额）对社会福利的影响，发现投入配额比产出配额造成的无谓损失更小。
Abstract This article investigates the welfare effects of alternate producer collusion schemes in a context where collusion is authorized in order to cover fixed costs. Using a linear equilibrium displacement model, we find evidence that, when the producer group is allowed to control quota levels, an input quota policy entails a smaller absolute deadweight loss than an output quota policy. This finding suggests that if producer groups are allowed to resort to production‐distorting instruments to limit output, they will make production choices that are less costly for society than if they had been allowed to directly control output levels.