The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency
研究重复委托代理模型中，基于可验证信号的工资与基于隐性承诺的奖金如何互动，以平滑风险规避代理人的消费路径。
In a repeated principal–agent model in which the agent's actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court, the agent's incentives derive both from salary payments based on verifiable signals and from implicit promises by the principal of bonuses for good behavior. Explicit short-term contracts are designed to enhance the effectiveness of the infinite-horizon implicit contract between principal and agent. In a constrained-efficient equilibrium, bonuses smooth the consumption path of the risk-averse agent by moving in the opposite direction from salaries, total consumption, and expected discounted utility for the rest of the game.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C7, C73, D8.