Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment
研究在双边贸易中，预期损害赔偿作为违约补救措施能否促进买卖双方的关系专用性投资，发现当双方都有违约风险时，简单的价格-数量合同可以实现最优投资效率。
This paper examines the efficiency of expectation damages as a breach remedy in a bilateral trade setting with renegotiation and relationship-specific investment by the buyer and the seller. As demonstrated by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), no contract that specifies only a fixed quantity and a fixed per-unit price can induce efficient investment if marginal cost is constant and deterministic. We show that this result does not extend to more general payoff functions. If both parties face the risk of breaching, the first best becomes attainable with a simple price-quantity contract.