Motivating Wealth-Constrained Actors
研究资源所有者如何在财富受限且能力未知的经营者之间最优分配资源，发现共享利润、分散所有权、竞争收益有限等规律，对私有化和风险投资有启示。
We examine how owners of productive resources (e.g., public enterprises or financial capital) optimally allocate their resources among wealth-constrained operators of unknown ability. Optimal allocations exhibit: (1) shared enterprise profit—the resource owner always shares the operator's profit; (2) dispersed enterprise ownership—resources are widely distributed among operators of varying ability; (3) limited benefits of competition—the owner may not benefit from increased competition for the resource; and, sometimes, (4) diluted incentives for the most capable—more capable operators receive smaller shares of the returns they generate. Implications for privatizations and venture capital arrangements are explored.