Mental Accounting and Disaggregation Based on the Sign and Relative Magnitude of Income Statement Items
通过实验研究管理者在损益表项目中是否分解信息的选择，发现其偏好符合心理账户理论，且这种偏好会影响投资者估值，对准则制定者和监管者有启示。
ABSTRACT Current financial reporting guidance allows managers flexibility as to whether to disaggregate income statement items. Such flexibility is problematic if managers prefer to aggregate in some situations and disaggregate in others because we conjecture that investors' evaluations of firms will predictably differ depending on whether performance information is shown in an aggregated or disaggregated fashion. We conduct a series of related experiments within the context of compound financial instruments to investigate whether managers' preferences follow the predictions of mental accounting theory; specifically, that presentation preferences vary as a function of the sign and relative magnitude of the income statement items. Results reveal that managers' disaggregation preferences reflect mental accounting. Further, the effects of mental accounting are moderated only when managers feel high pressure to report transparently. Finally, and most importantly, the preferred presentations of managers result in the highest firm valuations from investors, indicating that investors also rely on mental accounting. Our study has implications for standard setters, regulators, and researchers.