Investment and Market Dominance
分析寡头竞争中的持续投资模型，涵盖增量投资、专利竞赛等情形，研究低成本或高质量企业如何通过投资扩大领先优势，并探讨领导者投资效率较低或企业耐心足够时可能出现的抵消效应。
We analyze a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment.Special cases include incremental investment, patent races, learning by doing, and network externalities.We investigate circumstances under which a firm with low costs or high quality will extend its initial lead through investments.To this end, we derive a new comparative statics result for general games with strategic substitutes, which applies to our investment game.Finally, we highlight plausible countervailing effects that arise when investments of leaders are less effective than those of laggards, or in dynamic games when firms are sufficiently patient.