Do Competing Specialists and Preferencing Dealers Affect Market Quality?
实证发现，波士顿和辛辛那提证券交易所允许会员通过关联做市商内部化客户订单，对买卖价差几乎没有短期影响，尽管订单流大量从纽约证券交易所转移。
We empirically demonstrate that the opportunities the Boston Stock Exchange and the Cincinnati Stock Exchange offer members to take the other side of their customers' orders through affiliated market makers (to internalize orders) have little short-run effect on posted or effective bid-ask spreads. This is true despite substantial movement of order flow away from the New York Stock Exchange when trading under one of these regional stock exchange programs begins. These results contrast with the adverse effects of market fragmentation and internalization predicted by some theoretical market microstructure analyses and the popular financial press.