A Test of Lazear's Theory of Delayed Payment Contracts
利用美国全国纵向调查和职业名称词典数据，检验拉齐尔提出的延迟支付合同假说：在容易监督工人努力的工作中，延迟支付合同（如养老金、强制退休等）较少出现。
According to Lazear, workers and firms enter into long-term implicit contracts that discourage shirking and malfeasance by shifting compensation to the end of the contract. Such "delayed payment" contracts are less likely to occur in jobs in which it is comparatively simple to monitor worker effort. This paper uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles to test that hypothesis. In particular, it tests whether jobs that involve repetitive tasks tend to be characterized by an absence of pensions, mandatory retirement, long job tenures, and high wages for older workers.