Strategic R & D with Spillovers, Collusion and Welfare
研究在研发溢出效应下，非合作与三种合谋模式（研发合作、价格固定、合并）对福利的影响，发现溢出足够大时所有合谋都有益，但合并更可能带来特定好处。
The author considers a two-stage R&D then output or price duopoly game in which R&D spills over, so reducing the marginal cost of both the investing firm and its rival. The author compares the noncooperative regime to three collusive regimes--joint venture (collusion on R&D), price fixing (collusion at the price or output stage), and merger (collusion at both stages)--and evaluates under what circumstances a collusive regime improves welfare. If spillovers are sufficiently large, all three regimes are beneficial, although mergers are more likely and price-fixing less likely to produce specific benefits than are joint ventures. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.