Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection
研究当工人异质时，自由市场可能无法实现有效率的正当理由雇佣保护，因为单个企业转向正当理由会吸引更多低努力工人，但法律强制实施可能提高效率。
The free market may not lead to the efficient level of just-cause employment protection if workers are heterogeneous. Any firm that switches to just cause will attract a disproportionate share of workers that provide low effort, yet are difficult to dismiss with cause. Thus, there is an externality concerning each firm's just-cause policy. If all firms had just-cause policies, then the efficiency gains of just cause might outweigh the burden of the undesirable workers. Nevertheless, no single firm may find it in its interest to switch to just cause. It is possible for laws that require just cause to increase efficiency. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.