Angel Agents: Agency Theory Reconsidered.
代理理论通常认为高管会利用信息优势剥削所有者，但本文指出有时相反情况成立：所有者可能损害公司长期利益，而代理人反而像管家一样利用信息造福公司及其利益相关者，并通过历史案例说明这种情形发生的条件。
Executive Overview Agency theory stipulates that executives will use their superior information to exploit owners unless effectively monitored or incentivized to do otherwise: Agents here are held to be opportunists and owners responsible parties. However, sometimes agency theory misses the mark and the reverse holds true. It may be the owners who exploit their firm and compromise its long-term interests, and steward-like agents who use their superior information to benefit a firm and its stakeholders. This analysis provides an inspiring historical example of how that can happen and illustrates some conditions under which one might expect similarly happy circumstances to arise.