Person-Specific Information in the Labor Market
构建了一个个体投资信息的模型，假设无人拥有绝对优势，分析信息如何促进劳动力市场的分类匹配，并与人力资本和信号筛选模型比较。
Heterogeneity on both sides of the labor market implies that the correct matching of individuals to firms is of importance. If there is uncertainty about individual productive characteristics, there are both private and social returns to activities that generate information facilitating the assortative matching process. A model of individual investment in information is presented and analyzed. A key assumption is that there are no individuals who have an absolute advantage in all jobs. Under this assumption, all individuals view more accurate information as beneficial and therefore invest in its production. Comparative statics are derived and the model is compared to human capital and signaling-screening models.