A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets
研究了房地产市场中经纪人对买卖双方搜索行为和交易价格的影响，发现经纪人会降低搜索强度，但卖家获得的价格上升小于佣金，且价格上升部分与议价能力相关。
This paper examines the impact of brokers on buyers' and sellers' search behavior and on the transaction prices in real estate markets. It is shown that the seller and the buyer search less intensively if the house is listed with a broker. The seller gets a higher price when he employs a broker, but the increase in price is smaller than the commission fee. More specifically, the portion of the commission covered by the increase in price is directly related to the bargaining powers of the buyer and the seller. In the special case where the price is determined according to the Nash bargaining solution, the increase in price is shown to be half of the commission fee. It is also shown that an increase in the commission rate increases the equilibrium price but decreases the equilibrium search intensities.