Management of Earnings and Analysts' Forecasts to Achieve Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises
证实管理者为避免负盈余惊喜而同时向上管理报告盈余和向下引导分析师预测，并发现经营现金流和可操控应计项目均被用于盈余管理。
Abstract: This paper corroborates the finding of prior studies that managers avoid reporting earnings lower than analyst forecasts (i.e., negative earnings surprises) and provides new evidence of actions contributing to this phenomenon. Specifically, we provide empirical evidence of both (1) upward management of reported earnings and (2) downward ‘management’ of analysts' forecasts to achieve zero and small positive earnings surprises. Further analysis of the components of earnings management suggests that both the operating cash flow and discretionary accruals components of earnings are managed.