Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Price-Cap Regulation
提出一种激励管制机制，使拥有成本与需求信息优势的企业如实披露需求函数，同时无扭曲地抽取其信息租金，并实现有效定价、运营与投资。该机制与价格上限管制方案密切相关。
A regulatory incentive mechanism is presented in which the regulated firm has superior information about both cost and demand, compared to the regulator. The mechanism leads to truthful revelation of the demand function and extracts all rents due to private demand information in a nondistorting way. The scheme assumes that the regulator can observe lagged expenditures by the firm. This mechanism leads to efficient pricing, operating, and investment behavior by the firm. Finally, it is shown that the mechanism is closely related to recent proposals for price-cap regulation and that under certain assumptions simple modifications of these proposals will lead to the mechanisms discussed herein.