Environmental Conflicts with Reimbursement for Citizen Suits
研究企业与环境公民团体在环境监管执法中的诉讼冲突，分析胜诉后法律费用补偿对双方投入努力的影响，发现不对称补偿会降低总努力，且补偿超过50%时企业会放弃诉讼投入。
Conflicts between a firm and a citizens′ group can arise over environmental regulation or enforcement. The group and the firm compete, often in the courts, over the rewards of varying levels of regulation and enforcement. This paper explores the efficiency consequences of a contest between a firm and a citizens′ group where the group′s legal expenditures are reimbursed if victorious. Relative to symmetric reimbursement, we demonstrate that asymmetric reimbursement reduces the total amount of effort expended. In addition, if reparations exceed 50% of the group′s legal expenses, a firm will move first and invest zero effort. We also consider the impact of asymmetric rewards and ability.