Spatial Pricing with Differentiated Products
将空间定价政策分析推广到寡头企业生产差异化产品的情形，发现运费吸收式的空间价格歧视受竞争者数量、产品替代程度及企业选址影响，并可能源于合谋或预判对手行为。
This paper generalizes analysis of spatial pricing policies to cases in which oligopolists produce differentiated products. It is shown that spatial price discrimination through freight absorption is affected by the number of competitive firms, the extent to which their products are substitutes, and by the locations such firms adopt in the market. It is further shown, however, that spatial price discrimination may be the consequence of collusive agreements, or of attempts to anticipate competitors' actions. The simple (spaceless) foundations of current policies on spatial pricing need to be reexamined, but this reexamination must take into account interconnections between producers, the extent to which their products are differentiated, and their locations.