Stabilisation, Policy Targets and Unemployment in Imperfectly Competitive Economies
论证均衡失业率取决于央行的政策目标，在央行用货币政策稳定经济的模型中，通胀目标比产出、货币或名义GDP目标能带来更低的失业和通胀，原因是通胀目标下产品和劳动力市场的需求弹性更大，从而降低价格加成并使工资对失业更敏感。
This paper argues that the rate of equilibrium unemployment depends on the objectives of the Central Bank. In a model where the Central Bank uses monetary policy to stabilise the economy, we show that unemployment and inflation will be lower with an inflation target than with targets for output, money or nominal GDP. The intuition for this is that the elasticities of demand in both the product and the labour markets are greater when there is an inflation target; we show that this leads to a lower mark‐up of price over marginal cost and makes wages more sensitive to unemployment.